Research

Publications

Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense. Analysis (2021). (with Louis Doulas)

  • We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails.

Drafts (comments welcome!)

[On the perceptual justification of persistence claims] (Under review)

  • I argue that perceptual experience justifies claims about the persistence conditions of objects.

[On the theoretical virtues of metaphysical infinitism] (Under review)

  • I argue that metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical foundationalism are on a theoretical par.

[On extraordinary objects]

  • I argue that there are no extraordinary objects.

[On reference and easy ontology]

  • I argue that easy ontology, in its current form, is untenable.

[On the relationship between perceptual bias and epistemic blame]

  • I argue that unrecognized defeaters can affect the justificatory import of experience provided that we are epistemically blameworthy for failing to recognize them.