Publications
Against Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense. Analysis (2021). (with Louis Doulas)
- We argue that Bryan Frances’s argument to the effect that philosophy can overturn common sense fails.
Drafts (comments welcome!)
[On the perceptual justification of persistence claims] (Under review)
- I argue that perceptual experience justifies claims about the persistence conditions of objects.
[On the theoretical virtues of metaphysical infinitism] (Under review)
- I argue that metaphysical infinitism and metaphysical foundationalism are on a theoretical par.
- I argue that there are no extraordinary objects.
- I defend ordinary ontology by motivating an epistemic constraint on interpretation.
[On reference and easy ontology]
- I argue that easy ontology, in its current form, is untenable.
[On the relationship between perceptual bias and epistemic blame]
- I argue that unrecognized defeaters can affect the justificatory import of experience provided that we are epistemically blameworthy for failing to recognize them.
